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Abstract—Implicit authentication (IA) is gaining popularity over recent
years due to its use of user behavior as the main input, relieving users
from explicit actions such as remembering and entering passwords.
Various IA schemes have been proposed based on different behav-
ioral and contextual features such as gait, touch, and GPS. However,
existing IA schemes suffer from false positives, i.e., falsely accepting
an adversary, and false negatives, i.e., falsely rejecting the legitimate
user, more so than the more mature explicit authentication counterpart,
due to users’ behavior change. To deal with this problem, we propose
BubbleMap (BMap), a framework that can be seamlessly incorporated
into any existing IA system to balance between security (reducing false
positives) and usability (reducing false negatives) as well as improving
authentication accuracy. To evaluate the proposed framework, we imple-
mented BMap on four state-of-the-art IA systems. We also conducted
a comprehensive experiment in a real-world environment spanned two
years and eight months. Most of the experimental results show that
BMap can greatly enhance the IA schemes’ performances in terms of
authentication accuracy, security and usability, with a small amount of
penalty on energy consumption.
1 INTRODUCTION
Rich behavioral data gathered by various sensors embed-
ded in smart devices facilitates the implicit authentication
(IA) of users based on their behaviors [1]–[3]. In general,
IA systems authenticate users by matching their real-time
behavior to their historical behavior. Real-time behavior is
obtained from one or more sensors whose data can uniquely
characterize the user and distinguish them from other users,
at the time of authentication. Similarly, historical behavior
is obtained from the same sensors in the past and updated
after new data is collected. IA schemes typically run in the
background and stream data at an appropriate frequency
to ensure that data is sufficiently collected, and the battery
consumption is reasonable. IA is a promising method of
authentication since it generally does not require any form
of explicit user actions as in password-, biometrics-, or
token-based explicit authentication methods.
As with any other practical security system, IA sys-
tems need to strike a good balance between security and
usability. On the one hand, we need the system to cope
with the legitimate user’s behavior deviation and noise
[1], e.g., a change of routine, and not falsely rejecting the
user (usability). On the other hand, the system needs to
differentiate between a legitimate user’s behavior deviation
and illegitimate users’ behaviors to prevent falsely allowing
the adversaries to access the system (security). Compared to
explicit authentication, IA more easily induces and is more
susceptible to false negatives (falsely rejecting a legitimate
user) and false positives (falsely accepting adversaries), due
to the complexity of human behaviors and limitations of the
machine learning algorithms used for extracting the user
behavior model. It decreases the authentication accuracy
IA systems are able to achieve and hinders the systems’
wide deployment. In addition, since smart devices are a
popular platform IA systems run on, energy consumption
is an important consideration factor.
The majority of the existing implicit authentication
schemes [3]–[9] tend to use a specific feature such as touch,
typing, and location to uniquely identify users. However,
due to the diversity of human behaviors, multiple features
are needed to best identify each user in practice. For ex-
ample, some people who take the train at a specific time
during the weekdays will have a high user identification
accuracy using location-based features, e.g., GPS. Since this
situation may not be suitable for all users, e.g., the one who
has unordered location patterns, a comprehensive system
that adopts multiple features is necessary, especially in real
usage.
In this paper, we propose BubbleMap (BMap), a frame-
work to dynamically adjust and map users’ privileges for
accessing smart devices. This framework is independent of
the machine learning algorithm used to implement an IA
scheme and the features used, and can be adopted by any
existing IA system using various features [3], [4], [4]–[11]
as a plug-in to improve authentication accuracy as well
as balancing between security and usability. We introduce
intermediate privilege levels to the two-level (full access or
no access) systems used by the existing IA schemes in the
Initial Mapping step of BMap. An ideal IA scheme should
always map the legitimate user to the top level (full access),
and illegitimate users to the bottom level (no access).
Nevertheless, when the legitimate user’s behavior
changes, it becomes harder to distinguish it from illegitimate
users’ behaviors. The intermediate privilege levels are incor-
porated in BMap to buffer the impact of behavior deviation
so that the legitimate user still has access to some of the
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content (e.g., apps with lower security requirements), and
therefore usability of the system is improved. It enhances
security of the system as well in that an adversary will
not likely be mapped to the top level immediately due to
the buffering. However, the ultimate goal of BMap is to
help the IA system quickly reach a definitive conclusion by
mapping the legitimate user to the top level and illegitimate
users to the bottom level. This is achieved by the remaining
steps of BMap, Privilege Movement and Bubble Expansion
in which questions including where to move the current
user’s privilege, and how fast and how much to move it are
addressed to reflect users’ dynamically changing behavior.
As shown in our experiments, the time users spend in the
intermediate levels is only 0.4% of their total usage time,
and the authentication accuracy of the tested IA systems
enhanced with BMap is universally improved. Main contri-
butions of this paper include:
• We design BMap, and apply it to various state-of-
the-art IA systems to boost their performance in terms of
authentication accuracy, security, and usability. It is a plug-
and-play that bridges the gap between IA research and the
deployment of IA in practical systems.
•We implement BMap using Android smartphones and
multiple servers. It contains various IA modules, such as
data collection, privilege control, and user authentication.
• We evaluate the performances of the existing IA sys-
tems enhanced with BMap using large-scale comprehensive
simulations and real-world experiments conducted over
two years and eight months. We give quantitative results
on the increase of authentication accuracy and analysis on
improved security and usability. In addition, the energy
consumption incurred by BMap is shown to be small.
2 THE PROPOSED BMAP FRAMEWORK
We first provide an overview of the BMap framework and
then elaborate on the detailed design.
2.1 System Overview
Generally speaking, existing IA schemes authenticate users
by deriving a behavior score  using data gathered in a
period of time, called time window (or authentication cycle)
which is a design-specific parameter. The score  is then
compared with a threshold, e.g., 0.5, and if the threshold
is exceeded, the system concludes that the current user
is illegitimate and locks the device. When legitimate and
illegitimate users have vastly different behaviors, existing
IA schemes can achieve high authentication accuracy 1.
However, based on our preliminary experiments using
the Friends and Family dataset [12], [13], more than 70%
of users’ behavior data overlaps and cannot be separated
by simply setting a threshold. As a simple example, we
randomly selected two participants from the dataset, one
as the legitimate user and the other as the illegitimate user,
and converted the system’s output to probabilistic behavior
1. The accuracy of the identification is calculated by ACC =
TR+TA
TR+TA+FR+FA
, where the true accept (TA) denotes a legitimate
user’s data sample has been correctly identified, otherwise denoted by
false accept (FA), and the false reject (FR) denotes a legitimate user’s
data sample has been incorrectly identified to be illegitimate users’ data
sample, otherwise denoted by true accept (TR).
scores 2. The time window is set to 15 seconds. As shown in
Fig. 1 (a) and (b), the legitimate and illegitimate users both
have a large proportion of behavior scores located around
the threshold 0.5 which makes them inseparable. The be-
havior overlapping problem can be exacerbated by mimicry
attacks where the adversary imitates the legitimate user’s
behaviors [14]. BMap attempts to improve authentication
accuracy even in the presence of this problem, by using
the proposed Initial Mapping , Privilege Movement and Bubble
Expansion, which will be discussed in what follows.
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Legitimate
=0.5379
(a)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Illegitimate
 =0.2884
(b)
Fig. 1: Behavior scores of (a) a legitimate user, (b) an illegiti-
mate user.
On a high level, in Initial Mapping, three bubbles, le-
gitimate bubble, slack bubble, and illegitimate bubble are
created by defining their boundary values α and β based on
the legitimate user’s historical behavior data. Each bubble
contains different privilege levels representing access rights
to apps of different security levels. Privilege Movement then
determines where to move the user’s privilege level based
on his current behavior. Bubble Expansion is used to fine tune
the bubble sizes defined in Initial Mapping and how far the
privilege level should be moved in Privilege Movement. It
reduces the impact of noisy data and behavior deviation
and therefore improves authentication accuracy. Specifically,
the first step in BMap is to map multiple privilege levels
to the three bubbles using Initial Mapping. We add a few
intermediate privilege levels to the two-level (full access or
no access) systems used by the existing IA schemes. Apps
are categorized based on their security requirements and
mapped to privilege levels. For instance, in a system with
n (n ≥ 3) privilege levels R1 through Rn, apps can be
mapped to the levels as shown in Fig. 2. Apps with the
highest security requirements such as banking, e-commerce,
health and fitness, credit score, and password manager are
mapped to the highest privilege level R1. Apps with lower
security requirements such as social media, texting, games,
and utility apps are mapped to lower levels such as R2, R3,
Rn−1. Rn is the lowest privilege level which corresponds
to locking the device no access. The legitimate bubble, slack
bubble, and illegitimate bubble contain the top level R1, the
intermediate levels R2 to Rn−1, and the bottom level Rn,
respectively. Note that defining the privilege levels, the se-
curity requirements for the apps, and their correspondence
is system and user dependent. It is relevant but not a focus
2. In this test, the setting and features of the dataset are the same as
Section 3.
2
of this paper. Interested readers are referred to [15]–[18] for
more details. Generally, a three-level system is required, and
the number of privilege levels is proportional to the number
of categories for different apps [18], e.g., utilities, entertain-
ment, and news. After obtaining the privilege levels, the
system needs to map the user to a specific level Rc based on
the user’s current behavior at the time of authentication. The
level Rc is called the user’s current level as shown in Fig.
2. This is performed in the second step of BMap, Privilege
Movement. Once in this level, the user has access to all the
apps corresponding to Rc and the levels below Rc, but not
the levels above Rc. Moreover, overlapping behaviors are
effectively separated in this step. Finally, Bubble Expansion is
used to dynamically adjust the privilege boundaries as more
behavior data becomes available and to filter out behavior
and sensor noises. The bubble’s status is similar to the real
word one, which can be represented by using physical laws.
R1
R2
...
Rn
Privilege 
Levels
Applications
Rn
Bubble 
Expansion
Rc
Initial 
Mapping Privilege 
Movement
R1 ...
Fig. 2: The BMap Framework.
Adversaries in BMap BMap defends against password
guessing attacks and behavior mimicry attacks (adver-
sary imitating the legitimate user’s behavior). In password
guessing attacks, we assume that it takes the adversary
a few tries (exceeding the limit) to guess and input the
password correctly. Likewise, it requires some time for the
adversary to fully mimic the legitimate user’s behavior
[14]. We do not consider an adversary who can enter the
password correctly within the trial limit because this is a
general problem common to all existing authentication sys-
tems using password. Without loss of generality, we assume
the use of a backup authentication mechanism to count for
when the IA fails, similar to how a passcode is required
(with limited tries) to unlock an iPhone X when Face ID fails.
A password guessing adversary may eventually correctly
guess and input the passcode. But due to Bubble Expansion,
every wrong password input accelerates the expansion of
the illegitimate bubble causing the system to quickly map
the adversary to the bottom level, thus reducing false pos-
itives. Since mimicry attacks also require launch time [14],
BMap defends against them in a similar manner. BMap also
reduces false negatives by quickly mapping the legitimate
user’s privilege back to the top level once a correct pass-
code is entered within reasonable tries. We use the terms
illegitimate user and adversary interchangeably.
The passcode used to unlock the device is not to be
confused with the PIN number which the user can enter
to re-initialize the system and retrain the machine learning
model based on new behavior data [19]. This can be a useful
feature when the system keeps failing the legitimate user’s
authentication and needs calibration.
In this paper, we use a subset of all available features
in the Friends and Family dataset, i.e., GPS, accelerometer,
touch, SMS, app installation, battery usage, call logs, app
usage, bluetooth devices log, and Wi-Fi access points to
evaluate the existing IA schemes. For example, we use
the accelerometer data for Gait [20] and the touch and
accelerometer data for SilentSense [5]. In order to give a
fair comparison, we applied BMap to four state-of-the-art
IA schemes, Shi et al. [7], Multi-sensor [3], Gait [20], and
SilentSense [5], by strictly following the feature selection
and parameter tuning process in these schemes.
2.2 Initial Mapping
R1 R2 ... Rn
Score:
α β 0 1
Legitimate 
bubble
Illegitimate 
bubbleSlack bubble
...
Map:
Observation 
levelsTop level Bottom level
Levels:
Fig. 3: Initial mapping.
We mainly discuss applying BMap to SVM-based IA
schemes [3], [5], [20]. For the other IA schemes [1], [5], [7],
[21], since their output is already a probabilistic behavior
score, BMap can be directly applied.
DEFINITION 1. Let behavior score  ∈ [0, 1] denote the
probabilistic output of an SVM approximated by a two-parameter
sigmoid function 11+exp(Afi+B) [22]. In a specific training set
3,
we further divide the interval [0, 1] into n sub-intervals, called
bubbles, denoted by Dn ⊂ [0, 1]. The legitimate bubble is the
largest sub-interval that contains only true accept (TA) behavior
scores. The illegitimate bubble is the largest sub-interval that
contains only true reject (TR) behavior scores. The slack bubble is
the sub-interval in between the legitimate bubble and illegitimate
bubble.
The Initial Mapping mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 3.
The system first initializes the value of parameters α and β
by fitting the sigmoid function to the SVM output trained by
data sampled from legitimate and illegitimate users. Note
that the distance between α and β can be very small, e.g.,
0.01, but they never collide. The legitimate, slack, and illegit-
imate bubbles are blown based on these two parameters, in
which only the legitimate bubble can explode. Assuming
the system has n privilege levels, in each authentication
cycle as new data is collected, the SVM takes the data
3. A training set is a dataset that contains various users’ historical
behavioral data.
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as input and outputs a new behavior score indicating the
system’s authentication decision. If the new score falls in the
legitimate bubble, the system will move the user’s current
privilege level Rc to R1 (if Rc 6= R1) which grants the user
full access. If the new score falls in the illegitimate bubble,
the system will lock the device. If the new score falls in
the slack bubble, the system will map Rc to one of the
observation levels R2, R3, ..., Rn−1, where the user has only
limited access.
As shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), the legitimate and illegit-
imate bubbles are [0, α] and [β, 1], respectively. The slack
bubble is located in [α, β], which contains ambiguous be-
havior scores that could come from either the legitimate user
or illegitimate users and need separation. In a given dataset,
we can easily find α and β by searching for the largest
and smallest behavior score  derived from the legitimate
user’s and illegitimate users’ training data, respectively. In
Initial Mapping, we first assume that α and β are fixed
and focus on the mapping of the current privilege level
Rc to one of the observation levels in the slack bubble.
We then release this assumption in Section 2.4 when we
complete our discussion with the possible movement of
the bubble boundaries. Compared to the existing implicit
authentication schemes, Initial Mapping in BMap focuses on
both security and usability. Since the system only grants
full access to the user who is most likely to be legitimate,
security is enhanced. When the likelihood declines, instead
of completely locking the user out, the system maps the
user to an observation level that grants lower access rights.
It enhances usability if the user is legitimate while limiting
the security breach if the user is illegitimate. Nevertheless,
Initial Mapping only handles failed authentications in a more
gradual way by adding the slack bubble and observation
levels. It does not fundamentally ameliorate the false reject
(FR) and false accept (FA) performance, which will be the
focus of Privilege Movement and Bubble Expansion.
In Initial Mapping, the current privilege Rc is mapped
to one of the defined privilege levels [R1, R2, ..., Rn] when
a new behavior score becomes available at the time of
authentication and remains in that level until more data
comes in. Such a mapping mechanism does not fundamen-
tally improve the FR and FA performance since the system
still needs a way to confirm the user’s legitimacy once her
behavior score is mapped to the uncertain observation level.
Recall that the system’s goal is to eventually grant the user
full access if she is legitimate and lock her out otherwise.
The slack bubble is just a buffer for a smoother transition.
We introduce Privilege Movement in the mapping of Rc,
where Rc is moved up (towards R1) or down (towards
Rn) gradually out of the slack bubble. We assume that
the implicit authentication scheme gives high authentication
accuracy, i.e., the legitimate and illegitimate users’ behavior
scores fall into their corresponding bubbles rather than the
slack bubble, when the scheme is newly trained.
2.3 Privilege Movement
We summarize Privilege Movement mechanism in Fig. 4.
The system keeps tracking the user’s behaviors and once it
observes a behavior score that falls into the slack bubble, it
searches through the previous scores to find a more defini-
tive answer. If there were scores in the legitimate bubble,
R1 Observation Levels Rn
Current Privilege level
-μl +μa 
α β 0 1
Legitimate 
bubble
Illegitimate 
bubble
RC
Slack bubble
Top level Bottom level
Fig. 4: Privilege movement.
the system leans towards regarding the user as legitimate
and moves Rc upward with distance −µl at the end of
the current authentication cycle. This process is repeated
until Rc reaches R1. Similarly, if there were scores in the
illegitimate bubble, the system leans towards regarding the
user as illegitimate and moves Rc downward with distance
+µa at the end of the current authentication cycle. This
process is repeated until Rc reaches Rn. If Rc falls in be-
tween privilege levels, the user is assumed access privilege
of the lower level. The movement distances −µl and +µa
are design parameters that can be constants or variables.
For the discussion in this subsection, we let µl = l/2 and
µa = l where l is the fixed distance between privilege
levels. The system is thus less tolerable and more restrictive
when there is evidence that the current user is illegitimate.
It is also more conservative in giving the user higher access
privilege when the user’s legitimacy was confirmed in the
past but is currently in doubt. Such design is to enhance
security while not sacrificing usability. Moreover, the FR
and FA performance is improved since the system always
tries to move Rc out of the slack bubble based on evidence.
Privilege Movement mechanism has O(1) time complexity,
which renders the system’s latency the same as the implicit
authentication schemes without BMap. In the next subsec-
tion, we discuss making µl and µa variables to improve
authentication accuracy.
As an example, the behavior score distribution for the
legitimate user and illegitimate user is shown in Fig. 5 (a)
and (b), respectively, using the aforementioned simulation
with two participants (Fig. 1 in Section 2.1). The scores are
grouped into five one-hour time slots, where each time slot
contains multiple time windows. In each time slot, there
are behavior scores belonging to the legitimate/illegitimate
bubble that co-occur with scores belonging to the slack
bubble. The scores that belong to the legitimate/illegitimate
bubble are used as evidence and guidance to move the
scores in the slack bubble. When behavior deviation hap-
pens, Initial Mapping may map the legitimate user to the
observation level and still cause false rejects which are
corrected with Privilege Movement. The same is true for false
accepts. In addition, we randomly selected a time slot from
Fig. 5 (a) and (b), and magnified it in Fig. 5 (c) where the
threshold Ω is predefined to best separate the two users. For
the ease of presentation, we assume that there is only one
observation level and three privilege levels in total. In the
first time window, the legitimate user’s behavior score falls
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Fig. 5: Behavior scores of (a) legitimate user in a 5-hour period, (b) illegitimate users in a 5-hour period, and (c) both users
in 10 time windows.
in the legitimate bubble (shown in the figure) but her Rc
has not reached R1 (not shown in the figure). The system
therefore moves Rc upward for l/2. In the second through
fourth time windows, the score falls in the legitimate bubble
again but Rc has reached R1. So Rc remains in R1. In
the fifth through tenth time windows, Rc falls in the slack
bubble. Since the system observed four behavior scores
in the legitimate bubble, Rc remains in R1. If the system
observed scores in the illegitimate bubble instead, Rc would
have been moved towards Rn. The illegitimate user in
Fig. 5 (c) follows a similar Privilege Movement process.
Using the dataset [12], we were able to observe the co-
occurrence of legitimate/illegitimate-bubble behavior scores
and slack-bubble behavior scores for the same user in a
reasonably short period of time (2-3 minutes), in all of the
two-participant simulations we conducted.
The effectiveness of Privilege Movement is highly depen-
dent on the size of the legitimate and illegitimate bubbles.
If α and β are fixed, they may become less indicative
as more behavior data from either the legitimate user or
illegitimate users become available. This problem will be
addressed in the Bubble Expansion mechanism where the size
of the bubbles is dynamically adjusted to reflect the behavior
change and improve the authentication accuracy.
2.4 Bubble Expansion
We now introduce Bubble Expansion, in which the bubble
boundaries α and β are updated. In practice, due to be-
havior deviation and sensor noise, the initial setting of α
and β may become inaccurate. If behavior scores from the
legitimate user keep falling in the slack bubble, it may indi-
cate that the legitimate bubble is too small and more “air”
is needed to reduce false rejects. Similarly, the illegitimate
bubble may need to be expanded to reduce false accepts.
Authentication accuracy is improved as a result. As shown
in Fig. 6, the original legitimate and illegitimate bubbles are
[0, α] and [β, 1], respectively. The new bubbles become [0,
α′] and [β′, 1] after expansion. In addition, the system’s
latency is reduced since less Privilege Movement is needed
and the system can make decisions more quickly.
In a given dataset, it is straightforward to find out
whether the behavior scores that keep falling in the slack
bubble belong to the legitimate user. In reality however, it is
difficult for the system to know in which case the second-
factor authentication (password input for our discussion) is
needed to provide feedback, as previously mentioned. We
assume that the legitimate user will input the correct pass-
word and illegitimate users will input incorrect passwords
at the beginning of usage. Although illegitimate users can
guess passwords, after several unsuccessful tries the chance
that illegitimate users are locked out is increased exponen-
tially due to illegitimate bubble expansion. Similarly, an
attacker can also mimic legitimate users’ behavior, but it
also requires time [14]. Due to illegitimate bubble expansion,
compared to original schemes, attackers will have a larger
chance of being blocked before they fully mimic legitimate
users’ behavior. For this reason, the true reject rate and
the system’s security are increased. Correspondingly, due
to legitimate bubble expansion, legitimate users who input
correct passwords at the beginning of usage will have a
larger chance of being mapped to the top privilege level.
For this reason, the true accept rate and system’s usability
are increased.
α β 0 1
Legitimate 
bubble
Illegitimate 
bubble
Slack bubble
β'α' ...
R1 R2 Rn
Correct password
Wrong password
Levels:
Score:
Fig. 6: Bubble expansion.
We model Bubble Expansion by applying physical laws
that describe the motion of bodies under the influence of a
system of forces. Specifically, the expansion S in time t is
defined as:
S =
1
2
(a− aˆ)t2 + v0t, (1)
where a denotes the acceleration of the expansion, t denotes
the number of time windows or authentication cycles, v0
denotes the initial velocity of the expansion, and aˆ is the
resistance that slows down or stops the expansion. Every
time the user inputs the correct password and the behavior
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score is outside of the legitimate bubble, more “air” will be
blown into legitimate bubble, and expand it to contain the
behavior score where the expansion is proportional to the
distance between the behavior score and legitimate bubble
(− α).
The acceleration of the expansion a is defined as:
a =
Rd ∗ ε
W1
+W2 + δ, (2)
where W1 =
∑
i
n
(i)
l
+n(i)a∑
i
N(i)
is a balancing parameter that
controls the expansion, W2 is a constant representing the
initial acceleration,
∑
i n
(i)
l is the number of times the user
inputs the correct password when her score is in the slack
bubble,
∑
i n
(i)
a is the number of times the user inputs a
wrong password when her score is in the slack bubble,∑
iN
(i) is the total number of authentication cycles, Rd is
the distance between Rc and R1, ε =  − α is the distance
between the behavior score and legitimate bubble, and δ is
the mixture of behavior noise and sensor noise.
The expansion of the legitimate bubble may result in the
inclusion of illegitimate users’ behavior scores that origi-
nally fall in the slack bubble. To reduce such false accepts,
we introduce the resistance aˆ that constrains the expansion:
aˆ = a(
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa + θ), (3)
where θ is a constant that prevents α from surpassing β,∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa denotes the probability that the legitimate bub-
ble contains behavior scores derived from illegitimate users
in the training set, and εa denotes the behavior score derived
from illegitimate users’ data in the training set.
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
is estimated using kernel density estimator [23]–[25].
Substituting (3) into (1) and assuming t = 1, we have
S =
1
2
a(1−
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa − θ) + v0, (4)
where we let V = 1−∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa−θ, called fluid viscosity,
control when the expansion stops.
Substituting 2 into 4, we have
S =
1
2
(
Rd ∗ ε
W1
+W2)V + v0 + ∆, (5)
where ∆ = V ∗δ2 is estimated and eliminated using a Kalman
filter [26].
In each authentication cycle, if the user inputs the cor-
rect password, the predicted state estimate xk|k−1 which
controls the expansion of the legitimate bubble is de-
fined as: xk|k−1 = Fkxk−1|k−1 + Bkuk, where Fk =[
1 t
0 1
]
, Bk =
[
t2
2
t
]
and uk = (Rd∗εaW1 + W2)V . The pre-
dicted estimate covariance Pk|k−1 is defined as: Pk|k−1 =
FkPk−1|k−1FTk +Qk, where the process noise covariance is
Qk =
[
t4
4
t3
2
t3
2 t
2
]
∗ σ2a with σa being the magnitude of the
process noise (behavior noise). The innovation covariance
is Sk = HkPk|k−1HTk + Rk, where Hk =
[
1
0
]
and Rk
is the covariance of the observation noise (sensor noise).
Kalman gain is calculated as: Kk = Pk|k−1HTk S
−1
k . Since
a Kalman filter is loop carried, we update the state estimate
and associated covariance at the end of each authentica-
tion cycle as: xk|k = xk|k−1 + Kk(zk − Hkxk|k−1), and
Pk|k = (I − KkHk)Pk|k−1. We calculate the expansion as
Pk|kHk and need to rescale it before applying it to real
systems.
If the user inputs a wrong password, we let uk =
εl
Rd∗W1 + W2, and a similar process happens for the ex-
pansion of the illegitimate bubble. Furthermore, to defend
password guessing, if users continuously input wrong pass-
word m times, the legitimate bubble will explode until
users re-blow it by passing the hidden factor authentication
discussed in Section 2.1. Instead, the illegitimate bubble will
keep expanding and finally cause the legitimate bubble to
shrink. Note that the bubble boundaries α and β never
collide, since the slack bubble could become very small, e.g.,
with length of 0.01, but it never explodes.
In addition to causing false accepts, the expansion
of the legitimate bubble also affects Privilege Movement,
or more specifically, the distance of the movement −µl
and +µa. Now that the bubble boundaries α and β
are dynamically adjustable, the distance of the movement
needs to be adjusted accordingly. Leveraged kernel den-
sity estimator [23]–[25], we let −µl = −µl
∫ α
0
p(εl)dεl∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
and
+µa = +µa
∫ 1
β
p(εa)dεa∫ 1
β
p(εl)dεl
, where εl and εa denote the behavior
scores derived from the legitimate user’s and illegitimate
users’ data in the training set, respectively;
∫ α
0
p(εl)dεl
and
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa denote the probabilities that the legitimate
bubble contains behavior scores derived from the legiti-
mate user’s and illegitimate users’ data in the training set,
respectively; and
∫ 1
β
p(εl)dεl and
∫ 1
β
p(εa)dεa denote the
probabilities that the illegitimate bubble contains behavior
scores derived from the legitimate user’s and illegitimate
users’ data in the training set, respectively. If the ratio∫ α
0
p(εl)dεl∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
is large, it indicates that the legitimate user’s
behavior scores still dominate the legitimate bubble, and the
distance of Privilege Movement is appropriate. Otherwise, the
distance needs to be adjusted.
3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have established a large-scale synthetic environment
using MIT Friends and Family Dataset [12], [13], and have
conducted several experiments on BMap that contains a
top level, two observation levels, and a bottom level. The
MIT Friends and Family Dataset contains 130 participants
and has a total of 9 features (GPS, accelerometer, SMS, app
installation, battery usage, call logs, app usage, blue-tooth
devices log, Wi-Fi access points) recorded over five months.
It is a complete dataset about human behavior based on sen-
sor data. The sensitive information such as phone number
and chat history has been hashed to protect user’s privacy.
The detail of the dataset and its collecting process can be
found in [12], [13]. In addition, we have implemented Shi
scheme [2] and Multi-Sensor scheme [3] for comparison
purpose in the simulation. To evaluate the authentication
accuracy, we used the recommended settings of original
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papers [2], [3]. We adopted k-fold cross-validation [27] to
choose the best value of the parameters in each scheme, and
to conduct training and testing. The simulation uses data
from all 130 participants in five months, where we randomly
select one participant as the legitimate user and mix her
data with the data sampled from all other participants. The
simulations are performed 130 times for each participant
against all the other participants and averaged results are
derived for each test. We keep the illegitimate users’ data
portion in the range of 50% to 80% to simulate a more hostile
environment. Features contained in the dataset include GPS,
accelerometer, SMS, app installation, battery usage, call logs,
app usage, blue-tooth devices log, and Wi-Fi access points.
The detailed description of the features can be found in
paper [13]. In addition, the feature selection strictly follows
the description of the original papers [2], [3].
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3.1 Authentication Accuracy
In the test, the time window is set to 15 seconds, which
contains 1 KB user data. To simulate real usage, we divided
the whole dataset into 100 distinct subsets sorted based on
time, and performed tests by gradually sending the subsets
to the system. Finally, among all users, we evaluated the av-
erage authentication accuracies in each time window for Shi
scheme and Multi-Sensor scheme. We then applied BMap to
these two schemes and evaluated their corresponding au-
thentication accuracy. The results are shown in Fig. 7. In the
figure, Shi scheme denotes an original scheme proposed by
Shi et al [2]; Multi-sensor scheme denotes an original scheme
proposed by Lee et al [3]. The corresponding schemes after
BMap is applied are Shi-BMap and Multi-Sensor-BMap.
As shown in Fig. 7, the authentication accuracies for
both the Shi scheme and the Multi-sensor scheme are sig-
nificantly improved after BMap is applied. Specifically, the
authentication accuracies of Shi-BMap and Multi-Sensor-
BMap increase at the beginning and then maintain high
accuracies for the rest of the tests. In this dataset, the average
accuracies for Shi scheme, Multi-sensor scheme, Shi-BMap,
and Multi-Sensor-BMap are 64.12%, 81.26%, 97.44%, and
99%, respectively. The accuracy boost of using BMap is
significant for both schemes.
To further evaluate BMap, we repeated the test using
Multi-Sensor scheme for each feature and calculated their
accuracy improvement. Fig. 8 provides a more detailed view
of accuracy improvement in GPS, app installation, battery
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Fig. 8: Accuracy improvement for individual features.
usage, and blue-tooth devices log. Another feature has sim-
ilar patterns. In Fig. 8, the accuracy improvement for BMap
is not stable during the first few authentications because of
Bubble Expansion. It becomes stable after the 70th subset for
all four features. Generally, the accuracy improvement after
applying BMap is between 4% to 35%.
3.2 Performance under Large-scale Usage
TABLE 1: Performance evaluation under long-term usage.
Original Multi-Sensor scheme (±1.0)
Time* ACC % PREC % TAR % TRR % FAR % FRR %
200 87.59 92.01 89.17 69.39 30.62 10.82
300 84.40 87.77 87.08 67.84 32.15 12.93
500 83.16 86.90 84.62 66.77 33.23 15.37
Multi-Sensor-BMap (±1.0)
200 97.25 97.40 98.81 93.53 6.48 1.20
300 98.64 98.87 98.93 98.18 1.82 1.08
500 98.96 99.08 99.14 98.72 1.28 0.85
*Time stands for time window. ACC = TA+TR
TA+TR+FA+FR
, PREC =
TA
TA+FA
, TAR = TA
TA+FR
, TRR = TR
TR+FA
, FAR = FA
FA+TR
and
FRR = FR
FR+TA
.
We evaluate the performance of BMap under large-scale
usage using data from all users in three time slots containing
200, 300, and 500 time windows. We calculate the accuracy
(ACC), precision (PREC), true accept rate (TAR), true reject
rate (TRR), false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR)
in Table 1 for both original Multi-Sensor scheme and Multi-
Sensor-BMap. As shown in Table 1, the performance im-
provement after applying BMap is significant compared to
the original scheme. Another important observation is that
the performance of the original Multi-Sensor scheme does
not monotonically increase with time. In the other words,
the authentication accuracy of the Multi-Sensor scheme does
not always improve as we gather more behavior data. This
is due to behavior deviation and sensor noise. By applying
BMap to the original Multi-Sensor scheme, the system be-
comes more predictable in terms of improving the authen-
tication accuracy since it automatically corrects behavior
deviation and filters out noise in each authentication cycle.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, BMap’s accuracy
improvement becomes smaller between the 300 and 500
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time windows, compared with between the 200 and 300
time windows. As discussed previously, BMap reduces the
impact of overlapping behavior scores in the slack bubble
using Initial Mapping , Privilege Movement and Bubble Expan-
sion. Since it is loop carried, the accuracy improvement is
reflected gradually in each time window and the expansion
become slower and more stable with time.
In addition, using Multi-Sensor-BMap, we also simulate
password input for both legitimate users and illegitimate
users. Specifically, we assume 94% of legitimate users cor-
rectly input the password in each try based on the survey
result shown in [21]. We also assume it takes illegitimate
users at least three tries to successfully guess the correct
password. In practice, however, the average number of
guesses needed to pass the authentication is much larger
than three for most systems [28], [29]. In the test, there is
no illegitimate user being mapped to the top privilege level;
and 98% of legitimate users are mapped to the top level
since the beginning of usage.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
In the previous section, we mainly focus on the short-term
evaluation under large-scale synthetic environment. In prac-
tice, a long-term evaluation is also important. In addition
to the evaluations of Shi-BMap and Multi-Sensor-BMap,
we want to measure the performance of BMap on another
state-of-the-art implicit authentication schemes, e.g., Gait
scheme [30] and SilentSense scheme [5]. To measure the
performance of these schemes in real usage requires us to
implement several back-end services and servers for train-
ing and testing purposes. To this end, we implemented a
BMap-based system using Android smartphones and multi-
ple servers. We developed user-side services to achieve data
sampling, data storing, data packaging, noise filtering, and
authentication. The sampling algorithm is achieved using
the wind-vane framework [31]. We implemented a database
server to store users’ data and further filtered noise and
invalid data samples. We also implemented another server,
which is independent of the database server for training
purposes.
4.1 User-side Services
Running on the Android system, user-side services were
written in Java using the Google-SDK. Besides system-
level services, a sampling service periodically wakes up a
sampling algorithm, which gathers all the available sensors’
data and stores them in the cache database developed
using SQLite. The sampling speed and wake-up time is
dynamically adjusted for energy-saving purposes. A device-
server data transmitting service contains behavior matching
and data transmitting units. The behavior matching unit
is responsible for identifying users by comparing their be-
haviors using the model returned from the training server.
The data can be further encrypted in the data transmitting
units. In this paper, however, we mainly focus on BMap;
the data privacy preserving and associated techniques are
beyond the scope of the paper. Interested readers can refer
to [32], [33] for more details. The data transmitting unit is
used to upload sensors’ data stored in the cache database
to a database server through a secure channel. The user-
side services were installed and tested on a Motorola G2
with Andoird version 6.0. It has 1GB memory, 8GM local
storage, a Quad-core 1.2 GHz GPU, and an Adreno 305
CPU. Running in the background, the user-side services are
transparent to users.
4.2 Server-side Implementation
(a) (b)
Fig. 9: Database server. (a) Users are stored in different
branches of database. (b) Data is stored in JSON format.
The database server is implemented using Firebase
which is a NoSQL database that can easily handle multiple
users’ data transmissions. The training server utilizes a
Lenovo 16GM memory quad-core processor machine with
2.4GHz frequency in each core. The server has two GPUs,
which are an integrated Intel HD Graphics 4000 GPU and a
Nvidia GeForce GTX 660M GPU. All users’ data are stored
in JSON format as shown in Fig. 9. The data uploading
procedure has several steps discussed as follows. In the
beginning, based on device ID, behavioral data is stored
in different branches in the JSON tree with a distinct la-
bel, e.g., L9ed8NEiPN7pYN8XISM, as shown in Fig. 9 (a).
The device ID and label are a one-to-one correspondence
relationship. A monotonically increasing index is created to
store each data sample as shown in Fig. 9 (b). The index
and time stamp uniquely identify each data sample. For
example, in 9 (b) index “0” and time stamp “08-07-2018
12:21:3” uniquely identify the data sample in the JSON tree.
Behavioral data sampled from various sensors is stored in
different branches, e.g., in the index “0” it stores address,
id, latitude, and another seven different types of behav-
ioral data. To bridge the database server and training server,
we implemented a lightweight program using Javascript,
which can achieve fast data transmission.
5 REAL EXPERIMENT
To evaluate the performance of BMap, we conducted a long-
term real test since April 2016. Spanning two years and eight
months, we tracked the usage of 13 different volunteers
using the proposed system. In the experiment, each device
only has one legitimate user, while another user is deemed
as an illegitimate user. In addition, every illegitimate user is
required to guess the password and mimic legitimate users’
behavior during usage. To this end, the devices’ passwords
are randomly chosen with a length of eight characters that
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Fig. 10: Accuracy improvement for both original schemes and BMap-based schemes. (a) Shi scheme. (b) Multi-Sensor
scheme. (c) Gait scheme. (d) SilentSense scheme.
contain both letters and numbers. For each device, one
of 13 volunteers was using it in a period of time (longer
than two weeks); and thus, each device stores data from 12
illegitimate users and one legitimate user.
In the previous experiment, due to the limitation of the
dataset, we can only evaluate BMap on Shi scheme and
Multi-Sensor scheme. However, in the long-term real test,
we gathered rich usage information from all users. Besides
the features used in the synthetic experiments, we also
collected touch-related data, e.g., trajectory, pressing time,
and corresponding accelerometer reading, which makes the
evaluation of BMap on Gait scheme [30] and SilentSense
scheme [5] possible. To this end, we implemented Gait
scheme and SilentSense scheme in our system. Similar to
the implementation of Shi scheme and Multi-Sensor scheme,
we use the recommended settings of Gait scheme and
SilentSense scheme from their original papers. In addition,
we applied k-fold cross-validation to choose the best value
of the parameters in each scheme, and to conduct training
and testing. The feature selection strictly follows the descrip-
tion of the original papers.
5.1 Authentication Accuracy
TABLE 2: The number of times users been locked out
Scheme Original scheme BMap-based scheme
Legi.* Ille.* Legi.* Ille.*
Shi scheme 213 4863 179 6243
MultiSensor 187 5640 53 7015
Gait scheme 379 4310 205 5186
Silent Sense 179 3973 174 5800
* Legi. denotes the legitimate user. Ille. denotes the illegitimate user.
To evaluate the accuracies’ improvement of BMap on
different schemes, in the beginning, we measured the au-
thentication accuracies of original schemes using the testing
dataset. Using the same setting, we then applied BMap
to the schemes, and repeat the measurement on the same
testing dataset. The results are shown in Fig. 10. As shown in
the figure, for most of the users, BMap-based schemes have
higher authentication accuracy than the original schemes.
We calculated the average accuracy for original Shi scheme,
Muti-Sensor scheme, Gait scheme, and SilentSense scheme,
which are 79.39%, 84.71%, 74.46%, and 73.56% respectively.
We also calculated the average accuracy for BMap based Shi
scheme, Multi-Sensor scheme, Gait scheme, and SilentSense
scheme, which are 88.79%, 94.68%, 81.61%, and 85.85%
respectively. For all four schemes, BMap boosts their au-
thentication accuracy significantly, especially for the Multi-
Sensor scheme and SilentSense scheme. The authentication
accuracy improvements of Shi scheme, Muti-Sensor scheme,
Gait scheme, and SilentSense scheme are 9.4%, 9.97%, 7.15%,
and 12.29% respectively. Although none of the illegitimate
users successfully guessed the correct passwords, they can
still mimic legitimate users’ behavior and pass the au-
thentication, which is one of the biggest problems in to-
day’s implicit authentication schemes [14]. Especially for the
Gait scheme and SilentSense scheme, their corresponding
mimicry attacks are very effective. However, as shown in
Fig. 10, BMap can still reduce the success rate of the attacks
and increases the authentication accuracies of the schemes.
As discussed in Section 2.4, the adversary can brute force
the passwords, but it also expands the illegitimate bubble to
cover all the whole interval ([0 1]) and causes an imme-
diate locking of the device after inputting the passwords.
Similarly, when the attacker mimics the legitimate user’s
behaviors, it also enlarges the size of the illegitimate bubble,
which will significantly increase the chance of locking the
device. On average, the attacker is blocked from using the
device less than three tries. Although adversary can observe
legitimate user’s behavior without touching the device, to
fully mimic the behavior and launch the attack, it requires
multiple attempts [14]. We recorded the number of tries
for the adversary to successfully mimic legitimate user’s
behavior; and the result shows at least five attempts (2.5
minutes on average) are needed to pass the authentication,
which agrees with the result in [14]. On another aspect,
besides the observation, it also requires the adversary to
spend time using the device to pass the authentication. Both
observation and using time contribute to the launch time of
the mimicry attack.
In this test, for both original schemes and BMap-based
schemes, we stored the number of times of a legitimate user
being locked out of the device within 7,250 attempts. To
compare, we recorded the number of times of an illegitimate
user being locked out of the device in 7,250 attempts. The
testing results are shown in Table 2. Comparing to the origi-
nal scheme and BMap-based scheme, we can see the number
of times a legitimate user has been locked out is reduced;
and hence, the usability of the system is increased. Similarly,
the number of times an illegitimate user has been locked out
is increased. The security of the system is enhanced since an
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illegitimate user will have a higher chance of being blocked.
5.2 Time Consumption
We evaluated the time consumption of BMap, and com-
pared it with time consumptions of training, data transmit-
ting, data initialization, and data exporting in the original
systems. Table 3 shows the time consumption for different
schemes. The column denotes different stages of various
schemes. As shown in the table, the time consumptions
of BMap on different schemes are very small compared
to another operation. The total time consumption of each
scheme after applied BMap is shown at the final column of
the table.
TABLE 3: Time consumption for different schemes (sec)
BMap Training Trans.* Init.* Export Total
Shi scheme 0.046 0.524 0.96 1.57 1.03 4.13
MultiSensor 0.051 40.63 4.69 2.137 5.16 52.66
Gait scheme 0.127 14.28 0.95 2.917 1.03 19.30
SilentSense 0.140 3.291 1.03 1.918 1.06 7.43
* Trans. denotes the total data transmission time consumption in the
system except BMap. Init. denotes the time consumption of data initial-
ization. In addition, the data initialization contains data formatting and
noise filtering.
In addition, since implicit authentication utilizes a group
of data exported recently to identify users, e.g., 5,000 sam-
ples in each group, the size of the group impacts the time
consumption of the system. Given different data exporting
frequency, the time increment of BMap is shown in Fig. 11
(a). Furthermore, among different group sizes, we calcu-
lated the average time-consumption percentages of BMap
in different schemes, which are 0.9%, 0.0912%, 0.657%, and
1.037% for Shi scheme, MultiSensor scheme, Gait scheme,
and SilentSense scheme correspondingly. Specifically, the
time consumptions of BMap in Data Transmission, Ini-
tial Mapping, Privilege Movement, and Bubble Expansion are
shown in Fig. 11 (b).
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Fig. 11: Time Consumption. (a) Time consumption per-
centage in different group sizes. (b) Time consumptions of
different stages.
5.3 Energy Consumption
Besides the time consumption, we also conducted several
experiments to measure the difference between original
schemes and BMap-based schemes in the aspect of energy
consumption. In the experiment, we measure the batter
usage in the original schemes by calculating the average
working hours of battery after fully charged. To compare,
we also measured the battery usage in the BMap-based
schemes. The details are shown in Fig. 12. As shown in Fig.
12 (a), the average working hours of original schemes and
BMap-based schemes are almost the same. Specifically, we
calculated the battery working hour reduction by applying
BMap, which is less than 0.9% of the total working time.
The average battery consumptions in Data Transmission,
Initial Mapping, Privilege Movement, and Bubble Expansion are
shown in Fig. 12 (b). In the experiment, since we utilized
a secure channel to transmit users’ data, it consumes the
most portion of energy, especially for the Multi-Sensor-
BMap. In addition, the private data hash and formatting are
conducted in this stage. In the rest of stages, Initial Mapping,
Privilege Movement, and Bubble expansion have similar energy
consumption.
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Fig. 12: Battery Consumption. (a) Average battery consump-
tions for both original schemes and BMap-based schemes.
(b) Average battery consumptions of different stages.
5.4 Other Performance Measures
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Fig. 13: The proportion of behavior scores in each level.
(a) Average proportion. (b) Proportion in time windows 10
through 100.
We calculated the percentage of behavior scores that
were mapped to each privilege level in BMap, for the
legitimate user and illegitimate users. As shown in Fig. 13
(a), less than 0.4% of the behavior scores are mapped to the
observation levels, which indicates that BMap is fast and
highly effective in making the final decision.
We also calculated the behavior score distributions in
each privilege level for time windows 10 through 100 as
shown in Fig. 13 (b). The z-axis denotes the number of
behavior scores. The y-axis denotes the time windows. The
x-axis denotes the privilege levels, where the left three
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levels that contain top, observation, and bottom levels, are
plotted from the legitimate users’ behavior scores; similarly,
the right three levels are plotted from illegitimate users.
For both users, the number of scores which fall in the
observation level is small, less than 118 given a total of
27,138 scores, which is similar to the result in Fig. 13 (a).
6 RELATED WORK
The majority of the existing implicit authentication schemes
[3]–[9] focus on finding suitable behavioral features such
as touch, typing, and other motions that uniquely identify
users. The amount of data gathered by various sensors di-
rectly affects the accuracy of implicit authentication systems
[1]–[3]. By increasing the time spent in collecting users’
behavior data, the accuracy of implicit authentication can
be improved [2], [3] with the cost of usability. In this paper,
we proposed the BubbleMap (BMap) framework to improve
the authentication, accuracy, and usability of the original
schemes at the same time. Dynamically adjusting privilege
structure and absorbing the impact of various noises, BMap
adds another layer of protection to implicit authentication
systems, and is generally suitable for various schemes such
as [2], [3], [5], [7], [20], [30].
To complement primary authentication mechanisms
such as PIN and passlocks, various implicit authentica-
tion schemes have been proposed as secondary authenti-
cation mechanisms [3], [5]–[7], [30], [34]–[39]. Among them,
leveraging different features, Shi scheme [7], Multi-Sensor
scheme [3], Gait scheme [30], and SilentSense scheme [5]
are four different schemes that represent four research di-
rections of state-of-the-art implicit authentications [40], [41].
In addition, current implicit authentication research tends to
adopt all the available features to achieve a better authenti-
cation accuracy [1], [3], [31]. To evaluate the performance of
BMap, we implemented Shi scheme, Multi-Sensor scheme,
Gait scheme, and SilentSense scheme. We also show BMap
can seamlessly cooperate with another framework such as
[1], [31] to improve the system’s performance.
BMap utilizes privilege control to dynamically adjust
users’ privilege. Privilege control mechanism has been
widely used in different areas to enhance systems’ secu-
rity [15]–[18]. Analyzed users’ data, Eiji Hayashi et al [18]
suggest to use multi-level authentication to improve the
accuracy and usability of biometric-based authentication
systems such as implicit authentication. However, due to the
high complexity of human behaviors, the implementation of
multi-level authentication in implicit authentication has not
been seen. Implicit authentication mainly utilizes biometric
behavior such as touch, motion, shake, and armswing, to
identify users [11], [42]–[46]. Since users’ behaviors have
large divergence and contain various noises [1], [5], [19],
directly applying multi-level authentication to implicit au-
thentication systems is not feasible. To this end, we analyzed
the functionality of implicit authentication, mathematically
modeled the privilege changing process in implicit authen-
tication, and bridged a fine-grained privilege control to
implicit authentication systems using BMap. In order to
adopt sophisticated human behaviors, we upgraded the
traditional fixed-level privilege control [15]–[18], [18], [47]–
[49] to support any number of privilege levels.
To deal with the behavior and sensor noises, most of
the existing implicit authentication schemes use simple ap-
proaches such as resampling [3], averaging the results [5],
or no approach at all [44]–[46]. Such noises will degrade
system performance in terms of authentication accuracy.
The problem will be exacerbated as the size of the behavior
data grows. We applied a Kalman filter [50] to correct
behavior deviation and filter out sensor noise during the
authentication. We showed that a Kalman filter is naturally
suitable for implicit authentication and can be implemented
in practice to further improve authentication accuracy while
reducing the system’s latency.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed BubbleMap (BMap) to enhance
the performance of various implicit authentication (IA)
schemes. As a framework seamlessly lying above them,
BMap can significantly boost the performance of the original
schemes. In BMap, we modeled the privilege changing
process of users and bridged the privilege control mecha-
nism to implicit authentication. To this end, we introduced
Initial Mapping, Privilege Movement, and Bubble Expansion
techniques. In addition, we evaluated BMap in a large-
scale simulation on state-of-the-art IA schemes. We also
implemented BMap and performed a long-term test over
two years and eight months. The test results show BMap
can increase the performance of the original schemes with
a small amount of energy consumption. Specifically, in the
real experiment, the average authentication accuracies of Shi
scheme, Multi-sensor scheme, Gait scheme, and SilentSense
scheme are 79.39%, 84.71%, 74.46%, and 73.56% respectively;
and the average authentication accuracies after applied
BMap are 88.79%, 94.68%, 81.61%, and 85.85% respectively.
The time consumption increased by BMap is less than or
equal to 1% for all four of the schemes. Similarly, the
battery consumption increased by BMap is less than 0.9%
of the total working time. In the future, we will share the
system’s source code, parameter setting, and dataset on our
lab website to benefit associated research.
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